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Abstract
Endogenous Labor Supply, Rigid Factor Prices
and a Second Best Solution
The conventional wisdom asserts that distortions due to factor price rigidities
should be eliminated by subsidies. However, we argue that the success of this
policy rests upon the fact that the return to the factor is a pure rent. If factor
supply is endogenous, then subsidies to employers and taxes on factor owners are
needed to support the optimal solution. Since we believe this policy combination
works only by assuming away the problem, we then devise a model to study the optimal
policies in a second best world. Our results show that, in general, both factor
subsidies (or taxes) and export subsidies (or taxes) are needed to achieve this
constrained optimum.
ENDOGENOUS LABOR SUPPLY, RIGID FACTOR PRICES
AND A SECOND BEST SOLUTION
Harvey E. Lapan
Iowa State University
In recent years there has emerged a large literature which formulates optimal
policy interventions when distortions occur in the domestic econcMny.^ For example,
it is well known that if factor immobility and factor price rigidity prevent an
efficient allocation of resources, then the optimal policy intervention is a
subsidy that restores full resource utilization, thereby achieving a Pareto
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Optimum allocation of resources•
However, it should be noted that the efficacy of this policy depends upon the
assumption that the supply of the factor (the price of which is rigid) is not price
responsive. Under these circumstances, the return to that factor is a pure eco
nomic rent, and any tax or subsidy on that factor will have no adverse effect
(provided resources are fully utilized). On the other hand, if the supply of
the factor is price responsive, then the subsidy alone cannot achieve an efficient
allocation because differences remain between the price the factor is paid and its
marginal value product. Therefore, a subsidy designed to restore full employment
will lead to an overproduction of that factor if its supply is determined by its
factor price.
In this paper we plan to discuss optimal policy intervention when the supply
of labor is endogenous and when factor prices are rigid downward. The first
% section of the paper presents the basic model, derives the efficiency conditions
and discusses policies that can help achieve a Pareto Optimum allocation. However,
it is also argued that these policies are not likely to be feasible, so in the
second section we derive the second best solution for a simplified version of the
basic model. Finally, the third section presents an economic interpretation of
these conditions in terms of the specific policies that should be pursued and
concludes with a numerical example.
I, The Basic Model
The model we use is similar to previous models used to study the problem of
domestic distortions^ the main difference being that we assume the supply of labor
is endogenous. Thus, we assume there are two goods, C and M, and that each is
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produced using only labor. The marginal product of labor is assumed to be
positive, but diminishing in each sector:
(1) F.' > 0, F," < 0; 1 = c, m;
- labor input to sector i.
Further, we assume that the total number of workers and that the number of
workers in each sector (due to immobility) is fixed. However, since each worker
freely determines his supply of labor, labor supply is not fixed, but rather is
determined endogenously. Specifically, we assume that each worker maximizes,
subject to a budget constraint, a (quasi-concave) utility function that depends
on his consumption of each good and the amount of labor supplied (leisure con
sumed) :
(2) = U^(C^, M^, -lS; 1 = c, m.
i i i
In (2), C (M ) represents consumption of C(M) by a worker of type i, and L
represents labor supply by that type of worker (to sector i).^
Finally, we assume the country is "small" and can freely trade without
affecting world prices. Choosing M as the numeraire and letting P be the
(constant) world price of C, balanced trade implies:^
(3) PF^(N^) + F^(n") = P(C^ -f C") + (M^ +M°*)
Equations (1), (2) and (3) can be used to derive the efficiency conditions
for this economy. Note, however, that we are not free to use a single utility
function (or community indifference curve) to derive these conditions since
different types of workers might be called upon to supply different quantities
of labor (depending on their marginal value product). Rather, we derive these
conditions by tracing out the utility possibility frontier; that is, by maximizing
utility of workers of type c subject to a utility constraint for workers of
type m. The Lagraogean for this problem is:
(4)T1 =U<=(C^ -l'^ ) +Xilu"(c". -l") - ?]
+
Optimizing (4) with respect to C^, M^, and yields the standard efficiency
conditions:
(5) [U=/U^] = [if/u"] = P
cm cm
(6) [U^/U^] = PF^Cn"); n'= = h'^
(7) [if/if] = F • (N ) ; n" = l"
L m mm
In (5) through (7), subscripts on indicate partial differentiation; thus,
m
is the marginal utility of good Mto type c workers, and U? is the marginal utility
L
of leisure to type m workers.
The interpretation of these conditions is standard. (5) states that the
marginal rate of commodity substitution (MRS) should be the same for all consumers,
and equal to the foreign rate of transformation (P, the world price ratio); (6)
and (7) assert that the MRS between good i and leisure of type i should be equal
to the marginal rate of transformation (MRT) between these commodities. In addition,
the dual variables can be given economic meaning. For example, (X3/X2)
represent the shadow price of labor (of type c and m respectively) in terms of
the numeraire good M.
One important aspect of the problem formulated in (4) is that the solution
depends upon the value chosen for u"^. As we vary U™ to trace out the utility
possibility frontier, we change not ctily the distribution of coimnodities, but also
the amount of labor (and its shadow price) of each type that will be used, and
hence the amount of each good that will be produced.^ For example, if leisure is a
normal good in the utility function, an increase in U™ leads to a decrease (increase)
in the amount of labor of type m (c) that will be used, and hence to a decrease
(increase) in output of good M (C) and an increase (decrease) in the shadow
price of labor of type m (c).
Viewed in the context of a competitive model, this means that the equilibrium
wage rates depend not only upon preferences, commodity prices and technology,
but also on the fixed transfer payments that each type of worker receives.^ Thus,
the optimal policies needed to correct factor price rigidity in some sector depend
upon how transfer payments to each (type of) worker are determined.
For example, suppose for some given transfer to each type of worker that the
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competitive equilibrium wage rates (as determined by the dual variables) are W
and w to workers of type c and m respectively. However, assume that due to scane
institutional constraints, there is a wage floor, in sector C, and that > W^,
In the absence of government intervention, this factor price rigidity would result
g
in unemplo3mient and a misallocation of resources. What is the optimal policy to
be pursued under these circumstances?
The standard policy prescription (when the supply of labor is fixed) would be
to give a wage subsidy to employers in sector C, and to finance this subsidy via
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profit taxes or lump sum taxes on workers. However, while this policy might
restore full emploj^ment to sector C, it does not achieve an efficient allocation of
resources because the marginal rate of substitution between C and (W^) differs
from the marginal rate of transformation between these goods.
As is apparent, the particular first best solution could be obtained via a
wage subsidy to producers in C and an income tax on workers in C. If the wage
subsidy were (W^ - W^), and the income tax were (w'^ - W*^), and if transfer payments
were distributed in the same way as before, then this combination of policies would
restore full employment in Cand would permit fulfillment of the efficiency condi
tions (5-7). Moreover, the income tax would just finance the subsidy to employers.
However, it is unlikely that this policy combination would be effective since it
reduces the workers' net wage to W^. In fact, the policy works only because it
assumes away (for all real purposes) the wage floor; does not represent a
T
price that anybody in the economy pays or receives. Therefore, while a combination
of selective subsidies and income taxes could yield the first best solution, it is
hard to believe such a policy is practical; rather it would probably lead to an
increase in the wage floor (W^).
There is an alternative way to achieve a first best solution. Since the labor
supply (in each sector) depends upon the transfers received by those workers, a
redistribution of income will lead to a change in the equilibriuia wage rates.
Assume, as before, that for a given distribution of (non-wage) income the equi
librium wage rate in C lies below the wage floor, W^, if transfers to workers in
Mare reduced and transfers to workers in C are increased, then (assuming leisure
is a normal good) the competitive wage will rise in C and fall in M. Thus, it
is possible that a sufficient redistribution of income could restore a competitive
equilibrium. However, it will not be the same equilibrium as would have occurred
had there been no wage floor, and thus it will represent a different point on the
utility possibility frontier. If, in addition, we assume there is some social
welfare function that chooses a best point on the utility possibility frontier, then
it is unlikely that this redistribution of income will permit attainment of the
optimum optlmorum. Moreover, a redistribution, as outline above, could run into
two other problems: (i) since it lowers the competitive wage in M, some wage floor
constraint may become binding in that sector; and (ii) the process of transferring
income to workers in C rewards them for the wage floor. This certainly will cause
resentment on the part of workers in Mand may Induce either (or both) groups of
workers to strive for larger wage floors.
To sum up, we have seen that a Pareto Optimum allocation could be achieved
Id two separate ways: (1) by a combination of wage subsidy and tax in sector C;
(ii) or by a redistribution of income. However, we have argued that neither of
these policies is likely to be successful in that the tax-subsidy effectively
assumes away the problem, while the redistribution of Income alters the actual
Pareto Optimum point and may meet with resentment (or wage floors) from workers
in the other sector. Thus, we conclude that it might not be possible to achieve
the first best solution if the supply of labor is endogenous . In the next section
of this paper, we describe how a second best solution can be derived for this
problem.
II. A Simplified Model and a Second Best Solution
As previously noted, the equilibrium prices and output for the economy
described in Section I are not independent of the distribution of income (or
utility). Thus, the appropriate policy responses to distortions will, in
N
general, depend upon this distribution of income. Since we have no a priori
way of determining the "proper" allocation of utility among workers, we either
must formulate policy responses for all possible distributions of income (and
utility), or else find some way around this distributional problem. The assump
tion that we shall employ in the remainder of this paper is that there is only
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one t3rpe of worker and only one good produced in the domestic economy. While
this assumption is a strong one, we believe the results it allows us to derive
give a proper feeling for the second best solution in the more general case.
Specifically, we assume there are only workers of type c and hence that only
good C can be produced domestically. However, the country can trade by importing
M and exporting C and it is assumed that the terms of trade, P, are constant.
Production of C is as described by (1) and the preferences of type c workers are
given by (2). Assuming workers maximize utility and firms maximize profits under
competitive conditions, there is a unique equilibrium wage rate (W*), a unique
output of C, and unique consumption of each good.^^ Clearly, this equilibrium
yields a Pareto Optimum allocation.
Next, suppose there is a wage floor, W (measured in numeraire units), so
that wages in C(W) must be at least as large as W(W > W*), As argued previously,
the first best solution could be achieved by a combination of wage subsidies to
employers and income taxes on workers. However, for reasons discussed earlier,
this policy does not seem realistic; it works only by assuming away the problem.
If this policy cannot be implemented, then we must look for a second best solution.
The government is assumed to be able to control domestic prices and unemployment
12
through export taxes (or subsidies) and wage subsidies (or taxes) to employers;
however, the take-home pay of workers, W, cannot be reduced below the wage floor,
W, Using the tools at its disposal^ the government attempts to maximize social
welfare, assuming individual consumers behave as price-taking utility maximizers.
13
The constraints placed on government actions aret
(8) PF^(L • (1-u)) - PC - Ms: 0
(9) usO;u= the unemployment rate
(10) W - W s 0
(11) (U/U ) - W(l-u) = 0; W® =Wd-U)
L m
In (11), U- represents the marginal utility of leisure; in (10) it is assumed
W > W*, where W* is the competitive equilibrium wage rate.
Equation (8) simply reflects the balance of trade constraint; (9) and (10)
need no elaboration, but some further discussipn of (11) is required. Clearly,
(U_/U ) is the consumer's MRS between leisure and consumption of good M, and under
Li m
individual optimizing behavior, this is equated to the relative prices of the
commodities. However, if some unemployment occurs, the expected wage rate
(assuming jobs are randomly distributed) is W(l-u). We assume that workers base
14
their labor supply decisions on this expected wage rate.
If there is unemplojrment, then the labor supply, L, differs from the amount
of time actually spent working ((l-u)L). The question arises as to how the time
(uL) should be treated; should it count as leisure in the utility function, or
should it have the same disutility as work? We adopt the latter approach; if
desired, the time (uL) can be thought of as time spent in job search, and hence
time which is not available for leisure.
Under these assumptions, the Lagrangean for the optimization problem is:^^
(12) T1 - U(C, M, -L) + X[PF^(L(l-u))- PC - M] + Q^u
u.
+ Q.
u
- W(l-u)
m
+ Q3 [W - WJ
(13) >, Q^, s 0
Optimizing with respect to W, u, C, M and L yields:
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
^ = Q3 - Q^d-U) =0
^ =Qi - xPf'c'i' + Q2W =0
::vU
^ ="c - + ^2
V
cL
U,
u
m
U
m
U
mc
U
m
u - X + Q.
Lm
U, U '
L mm
m U U
m m
^«-U^ +XPF '^(1-u) + Q2
U
m
-u
« 0
= 0
u.LL ^mL
U u • U
m m m
» 0
From (14) through (18) it is apparent that all of the multipliers (with the
exception of Q^) must be positive, providing the wage constraint is binding.
While (16) through (18) might not seem Informative, manipulation of these
equations reduces them to a tractable form. Specifically, multiply (16) by U^,
(17) by and subtract (17) from (16):
(19) x\JjP - P] - Q, -"lc + r • + r • %
m m
Vc
m
U
mm
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where Ais defined as the bracketed term on the RHS in (19). In (19), P^ rep
resents the domestic price of C([P*^ - P] is the export subsidy), and, under the
behavioral assumptions, P^ = ^^c^^m^•
Proceeding in a similar fashion with (16) and (18), and (17) and (18)
respectively, yields:
(20) xPU^(l-u)lP F '^ - W] = Q2
-U.U, ufu u u„
L Lc L mc , c LL
T n T
U
m U'
U
m
m
U-U u ^
L c mL
U'
m
10
(21) aU^(1-u)[PF '^ - W] = -2
UtU X TTL mL . U . L mm
T iLll T O
U
m U
m
11
- Q^D
In (20) and (21) we substituted for the constraint, [U /U ] ®W(l-u). Again,
1j id
B and D are defined by the bracketed terms on the RHS of each equation.
While (19) through (21) may not appear to be an improvement on the earlier
equations, a moment's reflection will indicate that the terms A, B, and D measure
the complementarity or substitutability between the goods. For example, A rep
resents the change in the MRS between M and leisure as consumption of C and M
is varied, holding utility constant; thus, the sign of A reflects whether good C and
leisure are complements or substitutes. Similar interpretations hold for B and D,
Furthermore, the terms A, B, and D are (proportional to) cofactors of the
Bordered Hessian derived from the individual utility maximization problem. Thus,
they represent the slope of the compensated demand curve--that is, the substitution
term of the Slutsky-Hlcks equation. Specifically, it can be shown that:^^
(22) A = -
(23) B =
U P
m m
ac
sw® U P
m m
A \ "a
U P
m m G.
U P
m m
(24) D
U P ^pd )
m m 'n.
< 0
; A < 0
In (22) through (24), A is the determinant of the Bordered Hessian and must be
negative if the utility function is quasi-concave. The terms
h
m
thus.
, etc., represent the substitution term of the Slutsky-Hlcks equation;
< 0. Naturally, the normal symmetry relations hold for the cross-
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price effects.
Letting Pj^ - 1 and substituting (22) through (24) into (19) through (21)
yields:
(19') xuftp'' - P] =-(a)Q; L&W®)-] =
(20') XU^P(1-U)(P'^ F • - W) =AQ^r^ ^ 1 =
m c -• a -
(21-) XU (l-a)(PF • - W) = -&Q2 < 0
12
If desired, \ and can be solved for by substitution of (19*) through (21') into
(16) through (18).
Equations (14), (15), (19'), (20') and (21*) characterize the second best
solution. In Section III, we shall analyze the properties of this solution.
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III. Properties of the Second Best Solution
It is well known that if one of the conditions for an efficient allocation
of resources cannot be met, then it is not generally optimal to insure fulfillment
of the other conditions (Lipsey and Lancaster (1956-7)). In the context of the
model of Section II, this implies that free trade will not, in general, be
optimal if the first best solution is unattainable.
Specifically, the three Pareto Optimal conditions for the model of Section II
are that:
(i) the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between M and leisure
(which equals the expected wage rate) should be equal to the
marginal rate of transformation (MRT) between M and leisure
(via production and trade, and equal to PF^'),
(ii) the MRS between C and leisure (equal to W /P ) should equal
the MRT between C and leisure (F •)
(iii) the MRS between Cand M(P*^) should equal the MRT (FRT) between
C and M (P),
If, as a result of wage rigidities, the first best solution is unattainable,
then at least two of these three conditions cannot be met. Nevertheless, it is
possible that at least one of these ccnditions could be fulfilled (either P - P^
d
or P F ® W); the question is whether this is ever desirable.
The optimal policy responses to the distortion are readily ascertainable
from (19') through (21'). From (21'):
(28) W> PF '^ (L(l-u)) if W> W*;
where, in (28), W* is the competitive equilibrium wage rate. As a result of the
wage distortion, the MRS of Mfor L will exceed the MRT between Mand L. The
appropriate policy with respect to the domestic price level (P^) depends upon
the relationship between C and leisure. From (19'):
(29) sign (P*^ - P) =sign (^C/^W®)-)
Free trade is optimal only if leisure and Care independent goods (as defined fay
the compensated demands), if c and leisure are substitutes, then an export
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subsidy (P^ > P) is desirable, whereas if they are complements, an export tax
is desirable (P^ < P).
If P*^ ^ P, then from (28) it is apparent that W> P^F *, so that the MRS
of Gfor leisure (W/P^) will exceed the MRT between these goods (F ')• However, if
Cand leisure are substitutes, then P*^ >P, and the sign of [p'^ F '^ - W] depends on
the relationship between C and M. From (20'):
(30) sign - W] = -sign [aC/gP^)^]
If C and M are independent, then no wage subsidy or tax is appropriate, and ef
ficiency condition (ii) will be met. However, if they are substitutes (comple
ments), then a wage subsidy (tax) is the appropriate policy response.
Thus, none of the efficiency conditions will be met unless two of the goods
are independent of each other. In the general case, a combination of export
subsidies (or taxes) and wage subsidies(or taxes) should be used* The specific
policy responses are summarized in Table I.
Our second best solution differs from the usual results in two ways. First,
unless C and leisure are independent, free trade is not appropriate; when the
supply of labor is assumed exogenous, as in the standard models, free trade is
always the optimal policy. Secondly, either a wage tax or subsidy (or no inter
vention) can occur in our model; the standard models conclude that a wage subsidy
is needed.
These results can be explained intuitively in the following way. As a result
20of the wage floor, there will be an excess supply of labor; people will economize
on leisure, thereby consuming either too much C or M (or both). The optimal
policies should seek to counteract this misallocation. If C and leisure are
complements (substitutes), then too little (much) of good C is consumed as a
result of the wage floor. Thus, the optimal policy entails decreasing (in
creasing) P , thereby decreasing the quantity of labor supplied and increasing
15
21 ^
(decreasing) the amount of C consumed. This change in P serves to partially
offset the adverse effects of the artificial wage rate.
For the case in which C and leisure are substitutes, the question arises as
to how much should be increased; that is, as to the sign of - W]. If
C and M are substitutes (complements), increases in lead to increases (de
creases) in the compensated demand for M. Thus, if they are substitutes, the
increases in P^ can lead to overconsumption of M, so that it is not desirable to
increase P^ "too much" (P^F ' < W), On the other hand, if they are complements
c
(so that M and leisure are substitutes), then increases in P not only lead to
reductions in labor supply and consumption of C, but also serve to decrease the
overconsumption of M (due to the wage floor). In this case, larger export
subsidies are beneficial, and it is optimal to couple these with wage taxes
(pS '^ >W).^^
Our discussion so far has tacitly assumed that full employment is
desirable; if there is not full emplojnnent, then there is no real trade-off
between C (or M) and leisure. The role that unemployment plays in our model is
to reduce the expected wage (W(l-u)) to workers. Thus, unemplo3mient has some of
the same implications as an income tax, though it also entails the cost of
lost output due to idle labor (or lost leisure due to search). Intuitively,
then, we would expect unemployment to beccune desirable only when the minimum wage
(W) is set considerably above W*; that is, when the costs of maintaining full
employment (through the misallocation in consumption of C, M and leisure) exceed
the costs of unemployment.
Rewriting equation (15):
^ +Q2W =0
Since Q2 is a measure of the costs of the artificial wage rate (Q^ - Q2(l-u))» it
is apparent that the larger these costs, the greater is the incentive to reduce
Che effective wage rate (W(l-u)) and hence to create unemployment. From (21'):
(31) ^ uf(l-u)(W - PF„-)
23
Furthermore, It can be shown that:
(32) ^scA \ 0
Also, from (19') and (21'):
(33) ^ d
[Sc/.pd)-] =(P-P)/[(l-u)(W-PF^')]
Substituting (31), (32) and (33) into (15) yields:
16
^ ° =°avr=-- aw-^-
where (P - P*^) ^ 0. If the bracketed expression on the RHS in (34) is
^ u
negative at u = 0, then = 0, indicating that some unemployment is desirable.
For example, assume = 0, so that => P. Then (34) becomes:
(35) - Qi - XL - r • <" - - 0
As Wincreases, L increases, and PF^* decreases (at u - 0); if the compensated
elasticity of labor supply remains constant, the bracketed expression decreases.
For sufficiently large Wit could become negative at u = 0, indicating that some
unemployment is desirable. Even if C and leisure are not Independent, it is
likely that unemployment becomes desirable at sufficiently large wage rates. For
example, let:
(36) U InC + InM - L
(37) F^(N) =2N^ ; Ns I,(l-u)
In (36), Cand Mare independent, so P*^F '^ «W. Thus, Cand Lmust be substitutes
and > P for W> W*, the competitive wage rate. Therefore, an export subsidy,
but no wage subsidy (or tax) is desirable.
To solve this problem assume P « 1. The competitive equilibrium is:
17
(38) P^ = P=«=1;W*=1;M=C=«L=1
Next, assume a wage floor, W > 1, is imposed. C^timizing (36) subject to the
constraints gives the following solution:
(39) (a) W € 1. ^ (i) u = 0. L=i +1- + 7(8 + 1
2 J" ^ ' • 2 8 8
(ii) C «= L ^ , M« W
d W 2 ^(iii) P = X ^ ^ ^
(iv) P^F ' « W
^ ' c
(39) (b) W>^ (i) u=1- |j2 >0; ue (0, 1)
(ii) L= 2; N= 9/W^
(iii) C = (3/2W); M = (9/2W)
(iv) == 3; pS ' == W> W(l-u) °
c ^ ' 2W
We see that the particular solution corresponds with the properties outlined
earlier. Thus, since Cand Lare substitutes, P*^ > P and an export subsidy is
needed. Also, since C and M are independent, = W, and no wage policy is
needed. Moreover, for "small" wage distortions, full employment is desirable;
however, as argued earlier, large departures of the wage floor from the competi
tive equilibrium wage rate require some unemployment in order to reduce the
, 2L
expected wage rate to workers, and hence to hold down labor supply.
r-
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IV, Conclusion
Conventional wisdom states that wage subsidies should be used to eliminate
the distortions caused by wage rigidities. However, as we have argued, the
success of this policy depends upon the crucial assumption that the return to
labor is a pure rent. If labor supply is assumed endogenous, then the first
best policy must consist of wage subsidies to employers and wage taxes on
employees. It should be noted that this policy combination works by assuming
away the problem, since the (rigid) wage is not paid or received by any economic
agent.
When the first best solution is unattainable, the standard presumption in
favor of free trade is lost. The optimal policies in this case depend upon the
relationships among the goods and leisure, and could consist of interferences
with free trade and wage subsidies or taxes to employers. While the model we
have employed is a rather special one, we feel that the qualitative results
would hold in the standard two-good model. Thus, the optimal responses to
domestic distortions depend upon both the behavioral assumptions and the tools
available to the central authorities.
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FOOTNOTES
^For an excellent recent survey of this literature, see Magee (1973),
2
For example, see Bhagwati and Ramaswami (1963).
o
Our conclusions would not be significantly altered if we assumed there
were more than one factor of production,
'^ We assume that all workers of the s^e type have identical and homothetic
preferences and are treated identically. However, since different types of
workers may face different wage rates, we cannot represent society's preferences
with a community indifference curve.
^We normalize by assuming there is only "one" worker of each type. This
does not alter our result, given that the number of workers in each sector is
fixed.
^In most models used in this literature, it is assumed that a community
indifference curve can represent society's preferences. Thus, a change in the
distribution of utility will have no effect on prices, aggregate production or
consumption. However, this is not the case in our model.
^Given technology as in (1) and profit maximization, firms in each sector
will earn positive profits; these may be viewed as a return (or rent) to some
fixed factor, such as land. We assume these profits are redistributed to
consumer-workers, but that each consumer views these transfers as exogenously
determined.
g
Normally, the wage floor is assumed to be caused by a change in the terms
of trade. The proper solution is independent of the cause of this wage floor.
9 ~c ^c
If the supply of labor is fixed, the optimal subsidy is (W - W ), and the
financing of the subsidy does not affect labor supply. In our model, the quantity
of labor supplied depends on the net wage to workers and on fixed transfer pay
ments. Thus, the subsidy needed to restore full employment depends on the
method of financing the subsidy and the slope of the labor supply curve.
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assume all workers have identical and homothetic preferences and are
treated identically, so that a community indifference curve can be used to
represent these preferences. Alteamative methods of determining the appropriate
distribution of transfers include: (i) postulating a Social Welfare Function and
using transfers as a control variable; (ii) assuming transfers must be allocated
in specific proportions to each type of worker. This latter rule is arbitrary
and is likely to be inefficient.
^^Uniqueness is guaranteed by the existence of a community indifference
curve; we assume this equilibrium is stable. Also, we again normalize by
assuming there is only "one" worker of type c.
12
We assume that the government cannot levy income taxes; otherwise, the
first best solution is attainable. Note that lump sum taxes or transfers will
be ineffective (since all workers are identical) unless some of the taxes are
given away as a Balance of Trade surplus. This, however, will never be optimal.
13For the remainder of the paper, we drop the superscripts that identify
the type of worker.
14
For a similar treatment, see Harris and Todaro (1970). The assumption
workers respond to W , and not W, is not crucial to our main results. If they
base their decisions on W, then unemployment would never be desirable, provided
F ' > 0.
c
^^Alternatively, we could derive consumer demand and (labor) supply decisions
as functions of , W, and u, and then derive optimal policies, given these be
havioral assumptions. The two methods give the same results; we believe the
approach in the text conforms more closely with the literature.
^^From (14), if = 0, then = 0; from (16), \ > 0 and thus > 0 (u - 0).
' ^ d
Substitution in (16) through (18) yields [U /U ]=P, [U./U ]=PF . But W>W and P =P
cm Li m c
implies that labor supply L exceeds L*, labor supply in the competitive equilib
rium. Therefore, PF^* (L) < W* < W, which violates the constraint [U^/U ] =W,
Li m
22
Similarly, it can be shown that and must be positive,
^^These results are derived by maximizing U(C, M, -L) subject to;
W(l-u) L + T - - M a 0, where T is transfer payments. By totally differentiating
the FOC, we get the Bordered Hessian; inverting this yields the slopes of the
(normal and compensated) demand curves. The computations are omitted to save
space.
18
~ since leisure (-L), not labor, is the "good"
ap zB J-
u u
in the utility function.
19
Only two of these conditions are independent.
20
Even though the slope of the normal labor supply curve may be ambiguous,
the wage floor must increase L (given P^) since; (i) the compensated supply
elasticity is positive; and (ii) the wage floor lowers utility, thereby increasing
L, provided leisure is a normal good.
21 d
If C and Leisure are independent, changes in P have no effect on the
compensated labor supply, and the wage floor has no effect on the compensated
demand for C, Thus, it is optimal to let P^ = P.
22 d
If C and M are independent, P has no effect on the compensated demand for
M, so it is optimal to insure the equality between the MRS and MRT of C for leisure
(hence, P^F '^ =W),
23
This can be shown by performing a series of elementary row and column
operations on the adjoint matrix of the Bordered Hessian derived from the consumer
utility maximum problem (footnote 17). The proof is omitted to save space.
2^ e
For u > 0, W decreases as W increases, thereby decreasing compensated
labor supply. However, utility decreases as W increases, thereby increasing
labor supply. In our example, these effects just offset each other, so that
L is constant.
\ f
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TABLE I; OPTIMAL POLICY RESPONSES
and M
C and :
Leisure are: Complements Independent Substitutes
Complements Not Possible Not Possible Export Tax
Wage Subsidy
Independent Not Possible Not Possible Free Trade
Wage Subsidy
Substitutes Export Subsidy
Wage Tax
Export Subsidy
No Wage Tax or Subsidy
Export Subsidy
Wage Subsidy
